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Abstract
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1 Introduction
In social choice theory, we expect any collective decision within a group of individuals to
reect the preferences of its members over the feasible social alternatives. Since any in-
dividual is allowed to express freely his/her preference, it is however necessary to specify
which alternative will be selected for each conceivable prole of preferences. This mapping
is called hereafter a social choice mechanism. From a normative viewpoint, the concept is
well dened since, as long as preferences are the only individual characteristics which mat-
ter, the mechanism simply describes which alternative should be selected in any possible set
of circumstances. From a positive viewpoint, the mapping is truly a composed mapping,
as an institution is an object which can be far more complicated than a direct revelation
mechanism. An institution is described by a set of rules leading, from the perspective of
the analysis, to a normal form game. The key observation is that when we account for
equilibrium behavior in the setting describing that institution, we end up with a set of social
alternatives which only depends upon the prole of preferences. This means that under the
presumption that this set is nonempty and does not contain several alternatives, we can look
at the composed map (amalgating the institution and the equilibrium behavioral responses)
as a social choice mechanism.
In the context of a social choice mechanism, the strategic choice of an agent consists in
reporting his/her preferences over the alternatives. In this revelation game, like in any game,
the ultimate e¤ect of his/her choice will depend upon his report together with the reports of
the other individuals. There is no reason to assume that individuals will report the truth : if
an agent can secure a better alternative by announcing preferences di¤erent from the truth,
he/she may do so. These misreports can lead to a collective decision which has very little
to do with the one based on true preferences and may turn out to be quite unsatisfactory.
It becomes therefore important to identify which social choice mechanisms are immuned to
such manipulations.
In this paper, we will focus on two notions describing the resistance of a social choice
mechanism to manipulations. The rst one is strategyproofness which is a very strong form
of robustness against "misbehavior". A social choice mechanism is strategyproof or individ-
ual strategyproof ( when we want to call the attention on the fact that only the behavior of
individuals is taken into consideration) if telling the truth is a dominant strategy for every
individual. This means that an individual does not need to solve the strategic uncertainty
(attached, in principle to any game) to know what is his/her best strategy : no matter what
the others do, a lie never pays out. This strong form of incentive compatibility is attractive
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but very demanding. In fact, an extremely dissapointing but fundamental result due to
Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) states that if any preference can be reported, then
only dictatorial mechanisms are strategyproof. In this paper, we are going to investigate
the implication of strategyproofness for a class of environments where not every conceivable
preference can be reported by an individual. We assume that an individual can report a
preference from a prescribed subset of the all set of preferences, called the set of admissi-
ble preferences. Under that assumption of a restricted domain of preferences, the nihilist
conclusion of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem may disappear in the sense
that there exist non dictatorial strategyproof social choice mechanisms. In this paper, we
consider this general setting : for some domain of admissible preferences, strategyproofness
leads to a very narrow class of mechanisms while for some others, the class may contain very
satisfactory mechanisms. We dont touch the di¢ cult and open question of characterizing
the class of admissible domains of preferences leading to non dictatorial strategyproof social
choice mechanisms.
The second notion of resistance to manipulation that we consider aims to incorporate the
idea that besides individuals, groups (coalitions) of individuals may also play an active role,
not captured by the notion of strategyproofness. Precisely, we want to consider a notion
where the threats of coalitions are described and taken into consideration when designing
the social choice mechanism. This calls for a precise denition of what a coalition can do if it
forms1 that its members cannot do on their own. This question is very controversial and be-
fore explaining the precise version that we will use here, it seems important to discuss briey
some issues related to it. We may ask rst if coalitions can proceed in monetary transfers
and make binding agreements in which case the apparatus of cooperative game theory with
side payments could be useful to dene the power of coalitions in contrast to individuals.
In this paper, we will consider social environments where social alternatives are public in
nature and in particular such that no monetary transfers are involved. This precludes the
use of this approach to dene coalitional behavior in our paper. Then, the unique role which
is left to coalitions is to coordinate the reports of its members to attain a specic objective.
Without side payments, the objective cannot be the sum of the payo¤s of the members of the
coalition and the all Pareto frontier has to ba taken into consideration. Precisely, the deni-
tion of coalitional strategyproofness that we consider in this paper is the following. A social
choice mechanism is coalitionally manipulable if for some prole of preferences, there exist a
1We dont allude here to the direct cost(s) of forming a coalition. In principle; the trade o¤ between
these costs and the (expected) benets resulting from the formation of the coalition should be explicitely
formulated.
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coalition such that when their members jointly misreport adequately their preferences, the
mechanism selects an alternative that they all prefer to the one that would result all of them
had reported their true preferences.A social choice mechanism is coalitional strategyproof if
it is never coalitionally manipulable. This denition is the conventional2 denition of coali-
tional strategyproofness used in the literature. From the perspective of the revelation game,
it requires that the prole of truthful reports consitutes a strong Nash equilibrium (Aumann
(1959)). This is extremely demanding requirement as it is di¢ cult to guarantee existence of
such equilibria. Note, in particular, that it implies that the prole is a Pareto e¢ cient Nash
equilibrium; this means that a Nash (in fact, dominant strategy) equilibrium like the one
in a prisonner dilemna setting is excluded. In contrast, in settings like "pure coordination
games" where there are many Nash equilibria which are ordered alike by the individuals,
strong Nash equilibrium acts as a selection device.
We think that this denition is the most demanding conceivable denition of robustness
against deviations by coalitions. This means that if a social choice mechanism is coalitional
strategyproof in that sense, it is coalitional strategyproof in any other reasonable sense. If
instead, a social choice mechanism fails to be coalitional strategyproof in that sense, this
negative conclusion should be examined with caution. In particular, we may wonder if all
the coalitional threats should be treated equally. Suppose indeed, that a protable joint
deviation by a coalition is identied leading to the conclusion that the prole of reports fails
to pass the equilibrium test. If it turns to be the case that in the reduced game ( the subset
of players being the members of that coalition) some players or some subcoalitions of players
nd protable to further deviate from the deviation, then this may just deter the initial
deviation on credibility grounds. This type of criticism gave rise to several alternative and
less demanding concepts of Nash equilibrium robust to coalitional deviations, among which
the concept of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987)).
This concept is attractive because it is based on a consistent inductive denition of coalitional
deviation but some other proposals have also been formulated. With such concept(s), there
are, in principle, more coalitional strategyproof social choice mechanisms.
The main purpose of this paper is to study under which conditions the properties of
(individual) strategyproofness and coalitional strategyproofness coincides. Strictly speaking,
if a social choice mechanism is coalitional strategyproof then it is strategyproof but the
converse does not need to hold true. Our main contribution is to identify a su¢ cient condition
on the domain of admissible preferences for this equivalence to hold true. We call rich
2It comes often under di¤erent names : coalition, coalitionally and group strategyproofness are among
the most spread.
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domains such domains. Note that when this equivalence holds true, then the above discussion
about the appropriate denition of coalitional threats becomes irrelevant as any other concept
is nested between these two ones. In the second part of the paper, we illustrate the power
of this result through the examination of a specic allocation environment. It is important
to point out that behind our equivalence result, there is no hidden result like "if a domain
is rich, then a strategyproof social choice mechanism is dictatorial". Indeed, as we show
in that part, there are rich domains admitting non dictatorial strategyproof social choice
mechanisms.
Related Literature
This paper is at the intersection of two branches of the literature. On one hand, we
study the role of the domain of admissible preferences on the properties of a social choice
mechanism satisfying some other conditions. On the other hand, we are mostly interested
by the denition and implications of coalitional incentive compatibility constraints in the
design of a social choice mechanism.
We are not the rst to pay attention to the role of the domain in the characterization
of strategyproof social choice mechanisms. As the Gibbard-Satterthwaites theorem makes
use of the universal domain condition, it was natural to investigate the responsability of
that assumption in the derivation of the result. It was also useful since (besides voting)
most environments of interest entail restricted preferences. This literature is nicely surveyed
in Barbera (2001) and Sprumont (1995). To the best of our knowledge, very few general
principles have been established and the research has consisted mostly in the detailed study
of the implications of strategyproofness in some classes of problems. It is worth mentionning
few of these general results. Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin (1979) have introduced a
general domain richness condition that they use as a generalization of the universal domain
condition in the formulation of many results in the theory of implementation. In a general
class of allocation environments (covering the cases with private components), Fleurbaey and
Maniquet (1997) have introduced the notion of strict monotonic closedness and demonstrate
that for such domains, strategyproofness, non-bossiness3 and equal treatment of equals im-
ply no-envy. For the same class of domains, Moulin (1993) demonstrates that coalitional
strategyproofness and equal treatment of equals imply also no-envy. He also notes that
coalition strategyproofness could be replaced by Maskin monotonicity which, as noted by
Fleurbaey and Maniquet is a stronger requirement than strategyproofness and non-bossiness
3WThis property was introduced by Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981). We dont dene it precisely
: it amounts to require that if by changing his report, an individual does not change his allocation, then he
does not change the alocation of somebody else.
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together, under the Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin richness condition. These domain rich-
ness conditions are logically unrelated to our richness domain condition. Given two proles
satisfying some properties, these conditions ask for the existence of a third prole satisfying
also some properties. In contrast, our condition asks that for any single prole satisfying
some properties, there exists a second prole satisfying some properties.
We have already discussed some of the conceptual issues arising from the denition of
coalitional incentive compatibility. The strong form considered here has been incorporated
by many authors in axiomatic social choice. For instance, Moulin, in many (e.g. Moulin
(1994), (1999)) of his works on axiomatic cost sharing, uses it as a key axiom. Of course, the
question of coalitional incentive compatibility raises many challenging problems and have
been formulated di¤erently by other authors. Within the general theory of implementation,
Maskin (1979) shows that the set of social choice mechanisms which can be implemented
in strong Nash equilibrium is much smaller that the set of those which are simply Nash
implementable. With the weaker concept of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, Bernheim and
Whinston (1987) derives similar conclusions. Based on a di¤erential approach, La¤ont and
Maskin (1980) show the di¢ culty to conciliate strategyproofness and coalitional incentives.
This line of research follows some early work by Green and La¤ont (1979) emphasizing the
impossibility of constructing Clarke-Groves mechanisms which are robust to the formation
of coalitions. They assume4 that side payments are possible among the members of the
coalition and that coalitions do not face informational issues. When coalitions are confronted
themselves to the issue of elicitating information about preferences, we open the door to a
class of new and di¢ cult problems where the games of side contracting have to be properly
dened. Cremer (1996) revisits the family of Clarke-Groves mechanisms from that perpective
and obtain few positive results. Several contributions in the traditional Bayesian mechanism
design approach have paid attention to coalitional considerations in di¤erent settings ranging
from auctions to general organizations. La¤ont and Martimort (1997) have characterized
quite generally the class of social choice mechanisms which are immuned to coalitional side
contracting in this Bayesian setting.
2 Denitions and Notations
In this section, we present the class of social choice environments which we consider and
we introduce the main denitions and notations which are going to be used throughout this
paper.
4They call strongly coalition incentive compatible this class of Clarke-Groves mechanisms.
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We are interested in a situation where a society (group) described by a nite set N =
f1; 2; ::::; ng of individuals must decide which alternative to select out of a set X of feasible
alternatives. Each individual i 2 N is described by his/her preference Ri over X, which
is assumed to be a complete preorder. We will denote respectively by Pi and Ii the strict
preference and the indi¤erence relations induced by Ri. Sometimes, we will represent a
preference Ri by a utility function Ui, but the reader should keep in mind that, in our
framework, two utility functions representing the same preference will always be considered as
equivalent. A prole of preferences is a vector   (R1; R2; :::::; Rn) describing the preferences
of each individual in the society. If  is a prole of preferences and S  N is a subset of
individuals, then S denotes the subprole (Ri)i2S; when S = Nn fig for some i 2 N ,
we denote  i for S. If  and 0 are two proles of preferences and S  N , then 00 
S; 
0
NnS

denotes the prole such that 00(i) = (i) if i 2 S and 00(i) = 0(i) if i =2 S.
Denition 1 Let  be a subset of proles. A social choice mechanism with domain 
is a mapping C from  into X.
If  consists of all possibles proles, the domain is said to be universal. Otherwise, it is
said to be restricted. The notion of domain is central in our paper as the results are driven
by assumptions which will be formulated on the domain. We will limit our investigation to
Cartesian domains i.e. domains such that  =
nY
i=1
Di where for all i 2 N , Di is a subset of
complete preorders over X.
The social choice mechanism reects the aspirations and properties that this society
wants to take into account to proceed in selecting a social alternative. The input of such
mechanism is a prole of preferences. This means that once we know the diversity of opinions
in the society, conicts but also areas of agreement, we have, in principle, everything needed
to pick up a compromise. To operate, the mechanism needs this input, but in most cases,
this input is not known or veriable with certainty by all members of the society. Confronted
with this di¢ culty, we could then consider a broader class of social choice mechanisms where
the domain would be now a Cartesian set M =
nY
i=1
Mi where for all i 2 N , Mi is an abstract
set of messages or reports that can be sent by individual i. As every individual is ultimately
interested by the social alternative that will be selected, such a mechanism together with
the prole  of preferences generates a normal form game among the individuals which are
assumed to be rational players : for each individual i, the choice of the message mi to be
sent, constitutes a strategic choice.
Using the apparatus of game theory, we can predict the equilibrium behavior of the
individuals and therefore the social outcome. In this paper, we focus on social choice mech-
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anisms admitting equilibria in dominant strategies i.e. such that, for all prole  in the
domain , each individual i has a dominant strategy. It is well known5 that for such equi-
librium concept, there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to the class of social
choice mechanisms introduced in denition 1 and to impose that the report of the truth is a
dominant strategy for every individual in every possible circumstance.
Denition 2 A social choice mechanism C with domain  is manipulable by individual
i at prole  if there exists R0i 2 Di such that C ( i; R0i)PiC(). A social choice mechanism
C with domain  is strategyproof if there is no individual i and no prole  2  such that
C is manipulable by i at .
This property reects the necessity to provide incentives to individuals to make sure
that they report the right information. Strategyproofness is a strong form of incentive
compatibility as it requires the existence of dominant strategies. From the perspective of
constructing the social choice mechanism, this property acts as a constraint in the design of
the rule.
Some fewmore denitions and notations are needed. From now on, we limit our attention6
to the case where Di  D for all i 2 N . This assumption is not innocuous as it implies
that there are no intrinsic ex ante di¤erences among individuals. This rules out social
environments with private dimensions. Let D  [x2XDx where :
Dx  fR 2 D : xPy for all y 2 Xn fxgg
Dx is the set of preferences for which the alternative x is uniquely best. Finally, let
X  fx 2 X such that Dx 6= ?g be the set of alternatives which may appear on top for
the domain of preferences D which is considered and let C be the restriction of C to the
subdomain (D)n.
The following result which will be used in some proofs. Let :
C()  fx 2 X : x = C() for some  2 g
be the range of the mechanism C.
Lemma 1 Let C be a strategyproof social choice mechanism with domain D. For all
 2 Dn and all x 2 C(), if Ri 2 Dx for all i 2 N , then C() = x.
Denition 3 A social choice mechanism C with domain  is regular if C()  X.
5This is the so called revelation principle (Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin (1979). The reader may
consult Jackson (2001) for a nice overview of implementation theory.
6In what follows, we will often abusely use the expression domain for both  andD. Under this uniformity
assumption, we dont see any risk of confusion.
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To the best of our knowledge, this property is new. It requires that the range of the
mechanism is contained in the subset of alternatives which appear on the top of an admissible
preference. It is certainly controversial in any environment where an alternative which could
be considered as a good social compromise is disregarded simply because at best, it appears
on second position in any indididual preference. In this paper, we will consider environments
where the property of regularity does not raise any problem. The following simple lemma
will be useful.
Lemma 2 Let C be a strategyproof and regular social choice mechanism with domain D.
Then, C() = C().
Proof : Since C()  C(), we are left to prove that C()  C(). Let x 2 C().
Since C is regular, x 2 X. Let  2 Dn be such that Ri 2 Dx for all i 2 N . By lemma 1,
x = C() = C() and hence x 2 C() 
The property described in the following denition has been introduced by Barbera et
Peleg (1990).
Denition 4 A social choice mechanism C with domain Dn satises the modied strong
positive association7 property if for all ; 0 2 Dn, all i 2 N and all x 2 C(), if C() = x
and xP 0iy for all y 2 C()n fxg such that xRiy, then x = C ( i; R0i).
The following lemma due to Barbera and Peleg will be useful.
Lemma 3 A strategyproof social choice mechanism C with domain  satises the mod-
ied strong positive association property.
The notion of strategyproofness describes individual incentives to report the truth. The
next notion deals with the behavior of coalitions.
Denition 5 A social choice mechanism C with domain  is manipulable by coalition
S at prole  if there exists 0 2  such that C  0S; NnSPiC() for all . A social choice
mechanism C with domain  is coalitional strategyproof if there is no coalition S and no
prole  2  such that C is manipulable by S at .
Coalitional strategy proofness is obviously more demanding than strategyproofness. It
requires that there are no protable deviations from reporting the truth not only by indi-
viduals but also by groups of individuals. This property is very demanding as it does not
impose to the deviating coalition to be credible. When a coalition S deviates, it is faced
with a reduced game where the players are the members of S and it is natural to restrict
7Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) have proved the equivalence of strategyproofness and strong positive
association over the universal domain of complete orders. The modied positive association property is
neccesary but not su¢ cient in general for strategyproofness. Tanaka (2002) exhibits an association property
which is both necessary and su¢ cient on the domain of continuous preferences?
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attention to patterns of plays which pass some equilibrium test in this reduced game. Besides
protability, coalitional strategyproofness does not include such type of restrictions. Doing
so would lead to a less demanding notion of coalitional strategyproofness. So, in some sense,
the notion considered here is the more demanding one within this class of notions and if
a social choice mechanism veries that version, it veries any other property of coalitional
strategyproofness that may be reasonably considered.
We conclude this section with an important notion that will be used in subsequent proofs
and a technical lemma. Given a social choice mechanism C with domainDn, a prole  2 Dn
and a coalition S  N , we denote by CS

NnS

the social choice mechanism dened over
the subsociety S with domain DS by :
CS

NnS

(0S) = C
 
0S; NnS

for all 0S 2 DS
The range of the mechanism CS

NnS

will be denoted AS

NnS

: it describes the set
of alternatives (options) attainable by coalition S given the subprole

NnS

of reports by
individuals outside coalition S. These sets , called option sets by Barbera and Peleg (1990)8
will play a critical role in the rest of the paper. For all i 2 N and  2 Dn, the option set of
coalition fig will be denoted Ai [ i].
Lemma 4 Let X be a metric space and D be a subset of the set of continuous preferences
over X . If C is a strategyproof social choice mechanism with domain Dn then for all
 2 Dn and all S  N , AS

NnS
 \X is a closed subset of X.
Proof : Let  2 Dn, S  N and x 2 XnAS

NnS

. We claim that there exists " > 0
such that :
B(x; ") \ AS

NnS

= ?
Suppose on the contrary that for all " > 0, there exists z" 2 B(x; ") such that z" 2
AS

NnS

. Since x 2 X, there exists R 2 Dn such that 2 Dx. Let 0  (R; R; :::; R)
y  C  0S; NnS. Since y 6= x and R 2 Dx we deduce : xP y . Since preferences are
continuous, we deduce that there exists  > 0 such that for all z in the ball B(x; ) : zP y.
Select such a " > 0 and R" 2 D such that such R" 2 Dz". Let "  (R"; R"; :::; R") and
w = C("S; NnS)
Since z" 2 AS

NnS

, we deduce from lemma 1 that w = z".
8This technique has been pionnered by La¤ond (1980).
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Without loss of generality, let S  f1; :::::; sg where s  #S and consider the nite
sequence of proles
 ej
0js dened as follows :
eRji 
8<:
Ri for all i =2 S
R" for all i 2 f1; ::::::; jg
R for all i 2 fj + 1; ::::::; sg
Since C is strategyproof, we deduce :
C(ejS; NnS)RC(ej+1S ; NnS) for all j = 0; :::; s  1
Since C(e0S; NnS) = y and C(esS; NnS) = w = z", we deduce from above and transitivity
of R that yRz", a contradiction to z"P y 
3 Rich Domains
In the preceding section, we have introduced two notions of strategyproofness. Individual
strategyproofness takes into consideration protable dishonest reports by individuals while
coalitional strategyproofness extends the requirement to all coalitional dishonest joint re-
ports. As already pointed out, the two notions are nested : coalitional strategyproofness is
more demanding than strategyprofness. It is not di¢ cult to produce environments for which
it is strictly more demanding. The purpose of this section is to identify a class of social
environments for which the two notions coincide. Precisely, we introduce a condition on the
domain D of preferences which is su¢ cient for this equivalence to hold true. This class of
domains, that we call rich domains hereafter, is dened as follows.
Denition 6 A domain  = Dn is rich if for all R 2 D and x; y 2 X such that yPx
and y 2 X, there exists R0 2 D such that R0 2 Dy and for all z 6= x such that xRz, we
have xP 0z.
To be rich, a domain must contain enough preferences. Of course, the universal domain
is rich but there are also many restricted domains which meet this richness requirement.
Intuitively, when a domain is rich we are able to consider transformations of individual pref-
erences where the positions of two given alternatives are improved in the process. Precisely
the alternative y which was best among the two is now best among all and the other one
x still strictly dominates the alternatives that it was strictly dominating before but now x
also strictly dominates the alternatives belonging to its former indi¤erence curve. This is
illustrated on gures 1 and 2 in the case where alternatives are vectors in the two dimen-
sional Euclidean space. On gure 1, we have drawn the upper contour sets of x and y for
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y
R
the preference R. On gure 2, we have reproduced the upper contour set of x for R and
drawn, as a dotted curve, the upper countour set of x for R0. The upper contour set of y for
R0 consists exclusively of y.
It should be transparent from this illustration that for a domain to be rich, we must have
enough degrees of freedom to deform preferences. If not, the richness condition is likely to
be violated. Consider for instance the traditionnal Euclidean environment popular in formal
political science i.e. the setting where X is some Euclidean space <m and D is the subset of
Euclidean preferences : a preference R over X is Euclidean if there exists p 2 <m such that
xRy i¤ k x  p kk y  p k. The upper contours sets are the spheres centered on p. The set
of Euclidean preferences is not rich. To see why, consider the case where m = 2. On gure
3, we have drawn the upper contour set of x with y inside but di¤erent from p. As we can
see immediately, necessarily, the circle centered on y and containing x; has points outside
the rst disk.
We will see two important examples of rich domains in the next section. Besides these
environments, we can also prove9 that the set of continuous preferences over a metric space
considered by Barbera and Peleg (1990) is rich. However, it is important to call the attention
on the fact that there are general properties of preferences which preclude the richness
9A proof is available upon request from the authors.
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condition. For instance, if D is a subset of the set of separable preferences over a Cartesian
set of alternatives10, then D cannot be rich. To see why, consider the specic case11 where
X = <2 and D is the subset of separable preferences with single peaked marginal preferences
as dened by Barbera, Gul and Stachetti (1993) and Border and Jordan (1981): The domain
D contains preferences R such that p is best, yPx and xPz where the respective positions
of p, x and y and z are represented on gure 4. The key features of this pattern are that y
does not belong to the rectangle generated by x and p and that z belongs to the rectangle
generated by x and y. This is illustrated on gure 4 below. From the denition of D, it
follows that any preference R0 2 D such that y is on top for R0 implies that any alternatives
w in the rectangle generated by x and y is prefered to x according to R0. In particular, we
have zR0x.
Our main result on rich domains is the following.
Theorem 1 Let C be a social choice mechanism with domain  = Dn. If D is rich,
then C is strategyproof if and only C is coalitional strategyproof.
Proof : Let C be a strategyproof social choice mechanism on a domain Dn assumed to
10Intuitively, a preference over a product space is separable if preferences over each factor of the product
are dened without ambiguity. Such well dened projections are then called marginal preferences.
11A similar conclusion holds true for the domain of continuous and separable preferences considered by Le
Breton and Weymark (1999).
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be rich. We now prove that C is coalitional strategyproof. assume on the contrary that C
is not coalitional strategyproof. Then, there exists S  N and ; 0 2 Dn such that for all
i 2 S :
x  C(0S; NnS)PiC()  y
Since D is rich, there exists 00 2 Dn such that for all i 2 S :
R00i 2 Dx and for all z 6= y : yRiz ) yP 00i z
and for all i =2 S :
R00i = Ri
Given the construction of 00 and since C() = y, a repeated application of lemma 3 leads
to :
C(00) = y (1)
On the other hand, note that since C is strategyproof, the restricted social choice mech-
anism CS

NnS

= CS
h
00NnS
i
is also strategyproof. Since x 2 AS
h
00NnS
i
and R00i 2 Dx for
all i 2 S, we deduce from lemma 1 that CS
h
00NnS
i
(00S) = C(
00) = x in contradiction to (1)
While less important, there are also some other implications of the richness condition
that we would like to report as they will be used as auxilliary results in the next section.
Denition 7 A social choice mechanism C with domain Dn is dictatorial if there exists
an individual i 2 N such that for all  2 Dn and all x; y 2 C(), if xPiy, then C() 6= y.
A dictatorial social choice mechanism ignores the preferences of all but one individual
: the most prefered alternative of this individual, called the dictator, is selected to be the
social outcome.
Lemma 5 Let C be a regular social choice mechanism with domain  = Dn. If D is
rich, then C is dictatorial if and only C  is dictatorial.
Proof : Assume that C is dictatorial and let us prove that C is dictatorial too. Let i be
the dictator for C and assume on the contrary that i is not a dictator for C. Then there
exist  2 Dn and x; y 2 C() such that C() = x and yPix. Since D is rich, there exists
R0i 2 D such that :
R0i 2 Dy and for all z 6= x : xRiz ) xP 0iz
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Further, since C is regular, for all j 2 Nn fig, there exists R0j such that :
R0j 2 Dx
A repeated application of lemma 3 leads to C(0) = x. But, on the other hand, since
C(0) = C(0) and i is a dictator for C, we deduce that C(0) = y in contradiction to the
earlier statement 
4 Applications
The main purpose of this section is to illustrate the usefulness of theorem 1 though a detailed
examination of a specic12 but important environment. When a domain of preferences  is
rich, the analysis of the implications of strategyproofness in the construction of social choice
mechanisms is considerably simplied as we know that the mechanism is in fact coalitional
strategyproof. Note in particular that if a mechanism C is coalitional strategyproof, then it is
Pareto e¢ cient over the range C() i.e. there does not exist  2  and x 2 C() : xPiC()
for all i 2 N .
Since Pareto E¢ ciency put some constraints on the subset of social outcomes that may
be considered, this information can be exploited to simplify the analysis of the mechanism
C.
4.1 Allocation of a Budget Across Several Di¤erent Pure Public
Goods
The allocation environment considered in this section has been examined rst by Zhou (1991)
and is dened as follows. An exogeneous monetary budget of size normalized to 1 is to be
allocated across m di¤erent pure public goods. The set X of alternatives is therefore the
unitary m-dimensional simplex : (
x 2 <m+ :
mX
k=1
xk = 1
)
We assume that each individual i 2 N has a preference over the m-dimensional positive
orthant <m+ which is assumed to be strictly monotonic and strictly convex. The set D is
the set of restrictions of such preferences to the set X. It is straightforward to show that
12Without aiming to provide general guidelines for the user.
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a preference R is in D i¤ its upper contour sets are strictly convex. Theorem 3 stated
below holds true for all n and all m  3 but for the sake of simplicity, we will limit our
investigation to the case where m = 3 and n = 2. The case where m = 2 is considered in
the next subsection.
Lemma 6 Let m = 3 and n = 2. Then the set of preferences D of preferences with
strictly convex upper contour sets is rich.
Proof : Let R be a preference in D such that yPx for some x; y 2 X. Let A be the upper
contour set of x with respect to R i.e.
A = fz 2 X : zRxg
A is a closed and strictly convex subset of X with y 2 Interior A. Let A0 be a closed and
strictly convex subset of A such that y 2 Interior A0 and Boundary A\ Boundary A0 = fxg.
The construction of such subset is illustrated on gure 5.
Let J be the jauge of (A0   fyg) with respect to y i.e. the function dened by :
J(w) = Inf 
w y2(A0 fyg)
It is well known13 that J is a continuous and convex (here strictly convex) function such
that :
J(w) = 1 i¤ w 2 Boundary A0
Let R0 be the preference generated by  J . By construction, R0 2 Dy and for all z 6= x,
xRz implies xP 0z 
Lemma 7 Let m = 3 and n = 2. Let C be a strategyproof social choice mechanism over
D such that C(Dn) = X. Then, for all x 2 X and all R1; R01 2 Dx, A2(R1) = A2(R01):
Proof : Assume on the contrary that there exists z 2 A2(R1) such that z =2 A2(R01). We
construct a preference R2 as follows. On one hand, since from lemma 4, A2(R01) is closed,
there exists a ball B(z; ") where " > 0 such that B(z; ") \ A2(R01) = ?. On the other hand,
from lemma 1, we deduce that x 2 A2(R01). Let :
w  Boundary B(z; ") \ [x; z]
13See e.g. Rockafellar (1970).
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xy
Since R1 is strictly convex : wP1z. Since R1 is continuous, we deduce therefore that
there exists a ball B(w; ) where  > 0 such that for all u 2 B(w; ) : uP1z. Let fu0; u00g 
Boundary B(z; ")\ Boundary B(w; ). Consider the two half- lines with origin x and going
respectively through u0 and u00 and the convex set S as on gure 6.
Proceeding as in the proof of lemma 6, let H be dened over X as the jauge of S with
respect to z and R2 be the preference generated by H. We deduce that R2 is strictly convex.
Further, z is the unique best element and the boundary of S is the indi¤erence curve going
through x.
Since, by assumption, z 2 A2(R1), there exists R02 2 D such that z = C(R1; R02). Since
C is strategyproof, we deduce therefore that :
C(R1; R2) = z (2)
Now, let B be the set14 of best alternatives of R2 over A2(R01). By construction of B(z; "),
B \ B(z; ") = ?. Also, by construction of S and since x 2 A2(R01) : B  S. Further, since
C is strategyproof, we deduce therefore that there exist b 2 B such that :
14Since the set A2(R01) is compact, the set B is nonempty. Note however, that,since A2(R
0
1) is not
necessarily convex, the set B may contain more than one alternative.
18
x ( )'2 1A R
z
w
'u s
"u
C(R01; R2) = b (3)
From the construction of S and the position of b in S, we deduce from the strict convexity
of R1 that bP1z. Comparing (2) and (3), this implies then that C is manipulable by individ-
ual 1 at the prole  = (R1; R2) in contradiction to our assumption that C is strategyproof 
We are now in position to prove the main result of this section. To proceed, we will
use a result proved by Bordes, La¤ond and le Breton (1990) for the domain of Euclidean
preferences over X. Let bD be the subset of Euclidean preferences over <2 such that their
ideal point belongs to X. Without any risk of confusion, we identify bD with X.
Theorem 2 Let m = 3 and n = 2. Let C be a coalitional strategyproof social choice
mechanism over bD such that C( bDn) = X. Then, C is dictatorial.
Theorem 3 Let m = 3 and n = 2. Let C be a strategyproof social choice mechanism
over D such that C(Dn) = X. Then, C is dictatorial.
Proof : From lemma 7, D is rich and therefore, from theorem 1, C is coalitional strate-
gyproof. Let bC be the restriction of C to bDn. Then, bC is also coalitional strategyproof. We
deduce from theorem 2 that bC is dictatorial. Without loss of generality, let individual 1 be
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the dictator for bC. We now prove that 1 is also a dictator for C. This is equivalent to show
that for all  2 D2, the option set A2(R1) is equal to the unique best element of R1.
Let :
bA2(R1)  nx 2 X : x = C(R1; R2) for some R2 2 bDo
From lemma 3, we deduce that if z = C(R1; R2), then z = C(R1; R02) where R
0
2 2 bDz.
From lemma 6, bA2(R1) = A2(x1) where x1 denotes both the best alternative for R1 and the
Euclidean preference with ideal point R1. By combining both claims, we obtain that :
A2(R1) = A2(x1) = bA2(x1)
But, since 1 is a dictator for C, bA2(x1) = fx1g and the conclusion follows 
Theorem 3 can be extended to domains larger than D. Since here X = X, any social
choice mechanism is trivially regular. Therefore from lemma 4, we deduce that C is dicta-
torial i¤ C is dictatorial. Therefore, it is enough to prove that C is dictatorial. A careful
examination of the proof of lemma 6, shows that we dont exploit the full force of the strict
convexity of R1:What is truly needed is the strict monotonicity along any half-line with the
best alternative x1 as origin. This implies that any domain eD such that eDis contained in
this subset of convex preferences leads to the same conclusion.
The structure of the proof of theorem 3 is quite instructive. Once we know that the
social choice mechanism C is coalitional strategyproof, we can exploit the simple fact that
any restriction of C to a subdomain is also coalitional strategyproof. On these subdomains,
the geometry of the Pareto set is sometimes easy to derive. For instance, in the case where
the subdomain consists of the subset of Euclidean preferences, the Pareto set is the convex
hull of the ideal points of the two individuals. The proof of theorem 2 based on the technique
of option sets uses this property. Once we know what happens on a subdomain, it remains
of course to extend the result to the all domain. The key step15, which corresponds here to
lemma 7, is a "top only" property asserting that strategyproofness implies that only the top
alternatives of the two individuals matter in calculating the social outcome.
Theorem 3 is a slightly weaker version of an impossibility result established for this
environment by Zhou (1991). His setting is identical to the one considered here but instead
of us, Zhou does not assume that the range of the mechanism C coincides with X and
demonstrates his result under the weaker assumption that the range of C is two dimensional.
15This "tops only" property is a familiar cornerstone in this area.
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It is straightforward to see that the conclusion of theorem 3 holds true for the social
environment where X = <2+ and D is the set of preferences with compact and strictly con-
vex upper contour sets. However, this conclusion does not hold true for the domain bD. In
fact, as demonstrated by Le Breton and Sen (1999) when a domain D consists of separa-
ble preferences over a product set, strategyproofness implies decomposability. The class of
decomposable strategyproof social choice mechanisms contains non dictatorial mechnisms.
However, these mechanisms are not Pareto e¢ cient. If we insist on Pareto e¢ ciency, then
the class of strategyproof social choice mechanisms collapses on dictatorial mechanisms.
4.2 Single Peakedness
Theorem 3 was derived under the assumption that there are at least three di¤erent public
goods. When there are only two public goods, the set X is an interval. A preference
in D over that interval is single peaked. We know that for this social environment there
are many non dictatorial strategyproof social choice mechanisms, on top of which the so
called median mechanism. The general family of strategyproof social choice mechanisms
has been characterized by Moulin (1980). The domain D is rich and a shorter proof of the
characterization result exploiting theorem 1 could be provided. But more importantly, this
setting is interesting as it ilustrates the fact that there are domains where individual and
coalitional strategyproofness are equivalent without being equivalent to dictatoriality.
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